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THE NATURAL LAW
AND LEGAL JUSTICE
MIRIAM

T.

ROONEYt

It is gratifying to note the widespread favorable reader reaction
occasioned by our decision to print the papers presented last December at the Third Annual Natural Law Conference of the
Catholic Lawyers Guild of New York. The papers printed in the
January issue pertained to Commutative and Distributive Justice
and included a general summary of the natural law philosophy of
St. Thomas Aquinas. This issue presents the concluding papers,
which deal with Legal and Social Justice.

J

a federal court judge of the 2nd Circuit, once said
at the end of one of his books, that he had asked some of his natural
law friends, how different his decisions might be if they had been based
on the natural law philosophy, but he received little enlightenment. It is
a good question. As a matter of fact, it does make a difference, not in
every case perhaps, but certainly in those which are concerned with
basic human problems.
That justice demands a sound juridical philosophy as the basis for
human or positive law is emphasized by the fact that it is in the particular
determinations of individual cases that man does not participate naturally
in the eternal law even though the determinations are themselves contained in eternal law.
While it is in its application to individual cases that law displays its
force, since "the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice,"'
every human law has just so much of the nature of law as is derived
from the law of nature, for justice comes from being right according to
the rule of reason. 2 The paragraph where St. Thomas himself discusses
the relation of the legal just, or positive law, to particular applications of
law is as follows:
EROME FRANK,
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1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-Il, q. 95, art. 2.
2 Ibid.
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The Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle] (Ethic. v.
7) divides the legal just, i.e., positive law,
into three parts. For some things are laid
down simply in a general way: and these are
general laws. Of these he says that the legal
is that which originally was a matter of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so
no longer: as the fixing of the ransom of a
captive. Some things affect the community
in one respect, and individuals in another.
These are called privileges, i.e., private laws,
as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many
matters; and in regard to these, he adds, and
further, all particular acts of legislation. Other matters are legal, not through being
laws, but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees which have the force of law; and in
regard to these, he adds, all matters subject
3
to decrees.
St. Thomas refers to the indifferent in
another place where he classifies human
acts into three kinds:
Some acts are good generically, viz., acts
of virtue; and in respect of these the act of
the law is a precept or command, for the law
commands all acts of virtue [as Aristotle
says in Ethic. v. 1]. Some acts are evil generically, viz., acts of vice, and in respect of
these the law forbids; some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect of these the
law permits; and all acts that are either not
distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be
4
called indifferent.
The fact that human law permits some
things does not always imply approval of
them but may indicate that it is unable to
direct them, since many things are directed
by Divine law. A different situation would
,exist if human law were to sanction what
the eternal law condemns. 5 Hence, adds St.

Thomas, it does not follow that human law
is not derived from eternal law, but that it
is not on a perfect equality with it.6 Human
law not only may permit virtuous acts which
it does not direct, but it may give force to
virtuous acts not specifically prescribed by
natural law, for, says St. Thomas "... many
things are done virtuously, to which nature
does not incline at first; but which, through
the inquiry of reason, has been found by
7
men to be conducive to well-being."
From all that has been said so far it appears that this process St. Thomas speaks
of as the inquiry of reason seems to be the
one that is of greatest importance in the
formulation and application of human law.
Now the inquiry of reason may be either
along scientific lines leading to conclusions
about necessary matters, or along practical
lines leading to determinations concerning
contingent matters. It follows that rational
inquiry about law may be part science and
part art. Insofar as it is art, there is no question but that human law can be changed,
since rules of art derive their force from
reason alone, 8 although if the law has acquired some stability through custom or
releated acts, it would be imprudent to
change the law too quickly says St.
Thomas. 9
The next question would seem to be, how
is the inquiry of reason to be carried out so
that what results is identifiable as human
law rather than as science, art, or advice,
merely? There are four essentials in the
definition of law which St. Thomas gives us:
it is nothing else than 1) an ordinance of
reason 2) for the common good 3) made
6 Ibid.

3 Id., q. 96, art. 1, ad 1.

7 Id., q. 94, art. 3.

,4 Id., q. 92, art. 2.

8 Id., q. 97, art. 2, ad 1.

5 Id., q. 93. art. 3. ad 3.

9 Ibid.

APRIL,

1956

by him who has the care of the community,
and 4) promulgated. 10 The use of the word
"ordinance" implies that the direction given
will be obeyed. It is therefore something
more than mere counsel, although counsel
is a kind of inquiry. 1 It is more than ad12
vice, since advice has no coercive power
and can be given by a private person who
cannot make a law. 13 It shares the function
of training 14 for virtuous conduct with education, but operates by compulsion and
punishment usually instead of rewards. For
the use of the word "reason" in this definition, the quotations already made above
must suffice.
With respect to the second element,-the
common good-a modern analysis of St.
Thomas' meaning is greatly needed. For the
purposes of this paper, it can be pointed
out that St. Thomas says that man has a
natural inclination to live in society;1 5 that
he cannot live alone in society, paying no
heed to others, 16 and that human laws forbid chiefly those vices that hurt others and
without the prohibition of which society
could not be maintained. 17 Elsewhere he
states that the law extends only to rational
creatures subject to man and, properly
speaking, none imposes a law on his own
actions. 18
The third point concerns the official who
may authorize a law. St. Thomas describes
in detail the various forms of government

that may issue1 9 including government of
the people, or democracy. He states his
preference for representative government
in which Lords and Commons, or elder
statesmen and popular delegates, join in
sanctioning the laws. 20 He is specific in
looking to the consent of the whole people,
or to him who represents the whole people, 21 stating that a sovereign has not the
power to frame laws except as representing
the whole people. 22 It is the whole people,
23
not any individual, who can make laws.
The fourth point, concerning promulgation has already been touched upon earlier 24 in discussing how human beings know
law, whether by way of conclusions, of determinations, or by application. It is primarily through application that law is promulgated to each person. 25 Those who are
not present when a law is promulgated are
bound to observe it, insofar as it is notified
or can be notified to them by others, after
26
it has been promulgated, says St. Thomas.
There is another essential for human law
which is implied in the four elements listed,
but which should perhaps be spelled out a
bit more fully, and that is the matter of jurisdiction. 27 Jurisdiction pertains chiefly to
a judge, but no less so, to a legislator, since
both apply the law in promulgating it, the
one by decrees, the other by ordinances.
The most important limitation on jurisdiction is that man is not competent to judge

10ld., q. 90, art. 4.

19 Id., q. 95, art. 4.

11 Id., q. 91, art. 4, ad 2.

20 Ibid.

12 Id., q. 90, art. 3, ad 2.

21 Id., q. 90, art. 3.

13 Id., q. 92, art. 2, ad 2.
14 Id., q. 95, art. 1.
15 ld., q. 94, art. 2.
16 Id., q. 95, art. 3.
17 Id., q. 96, art. 2.
18 Id., q. 93, art. 5.

22 Id., q. 97, art. 3, ad 3.
23 Ibid.

24 See 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 28-30 (January 1956).
25 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I,
26

Id., q.

90, art. 4, ad 2.

27 Id., q. 96, art. 5.

q. 90, art. 4.
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of interior movements that are hidden, but
only of exterior acts which appear. 28 Another limitation is that human reason is not
the measure of things that are from nature. 29 Those things only are subject to human government which can be done by
man, says St. Thomas, but what pertains to
the nature of man is not subject to human
government.3 0 Neither can a human being
judge of eternal law.3

1

The sovereign him-

self is subject to the law, not in respect to
the coercive power, since no man properly
speaking is coerced by himself, but rather
in its directive force, which he should ob32
serve of his own free-will.
With the enumeration of these essentials
of human law, the way is now open to consideration of the application of law in individual cases and the degree of obedience
required. In general, St. Thomas advocates
the rule by laws rather than by men. Quoting Aristotle (Rhetoric, i, 1) he says:
It is better that all things be regulated by
law, than left to be decided by judges: and

this for three reasons: first, because it is
easier to find a few wise men competent to
frame right laws, than to find the many who
would be necessary to judge a right of each
single case. -Secondly, because those who
make laws consider long beforehand what
laws to make; whereas judgment on each
single case has to be pronounced as soon as
it arises: and it is easier for a man to see
what is right by taking many instances into
consideration, than by considering one solitary fact.-Thirdly, because lawgivers judge
in the abstract of future events: whereas
those who sit in judgment judge of things
present, towards which they are affected by
28 Id., q. 91, art. 4.
2

9 Id., q. 91, art. 3, ad 2.

30 Id., q. 93, art. 4.

31 ld., q. 93, art. 2, ad 3.
32 Id., q. 96, art. 5, ad 3.

love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted. Since the
animated justice of the judge is not found
in every man, and since it can be deflected,
therefore it was necessary whenever possible
for the law to determine how to judge, and
for very few matters to be left to the deci33
sion of men.
Notwithstanding his reluctance to rely on
the judgments in individual cases, he does
indicate in many places where the circumstances in individual cases may require that
the letter of the law be not applied.3 4 For
instance, he says, that certain individual
facts which cannot be covered by the law
have necessarily to be committed to judges,
... as whether something has happened or
has not happened.3 5 Another reason for relying upon a judge is that a proper conclusion about some human act may be true for
the majority of cases, although in a particular case it would be injurious.3 6 Furthermore, discipline should be adapted to each
one according to his ability and to his cir37
cumstances with respect to time and place.
The observance of a law may be hurtful not
only to an individual but to the general
welfare, since a lawgiver has only a majority of situations in view without being mindful of every single case.38 In fact, even if
a lawgiver were able to take all the cases
into consideration, says St. Thomas, he
ought not to mention them all in order to
avoid confusion, but should frame the law
according to that which is of most common
39
occurrence.
33 Id., q. 95, art. 1, ad 2.
34 Id., q. 96, art. 6.
35 Id., q. 95, art. 1, ad 3.
36 Id., q. 94, art. 4.
37

Id., q. 95, art. 3.
38 Id., q. 96, art. 6.
39 Id., q. 96, art. 6, ad 3.
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Now since there are so many occasions
when a judgment about the applicability or
observance of a law may be required, it
may be asked how far St. Thomas would
go in failing to obey the letter. In general
he indicates that the law should not be violated. If a matter be doubtful for instance,
the letter should be observed if it be not
possible to consult those who authorized
it.4 0 Again it may be possible to act beside
the law, as when there are many cases
where the law fails by reason of some
change in man and custom shows the law
to be no longer useful. 4 1 In case of necessity, the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law,
says St. Thomas, 42 adding that he who in
case of necessity acts beside the letter of
the law does not judge of the law but of a
particular case in which he sees that the
43
letter of the law is not to be observed.
With all his concern about the importance
of human reason, St. Thomas nevertheless
says that it would be dangerous to allow
dispensation from a law to the discretion
of each individual unless in a great emergency.4 4 He does, however, say that an official lawgiver may grant a dispensation for
good reason, but not merely out of arbitrariness.4 5 The most important exception of
all is his statement that it is not in respect
of persons if unequal measures are served
out to those who are themselves unequal,
because if the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive
special treatment, it is not respect of per-

sons if he be the object of special favor.46
Such dispensations may be made only with
respect to conclusions of general precepts,
never with respect to general precepts of
47
the natural law itself.
Apparently the only place where St.
Thomas would permit actual disobedience
of a positive law is when it is contrary to
the Divine law and therefore unjust because
beyond the scope of human power. 48 Otherwise he would appear to advocate toleration of the law until it be changed, in order
to avoid scandal 49 notwithstanding the fact
51
that the law may be tyrannical,50 unjust,
52
or beyond the powers of the lawgiver.
From this summary of the conclusions of
St. Thomas Aquinas about law, it would
seem that there is a lot of scope for the use
of human reason in devising rules in furtherance of the general precepts of natural
law, both with respect to matters concerning the majority of the people and those
concerning the application of positive laws
in individual cases. Indeed, human reason
and the principles impressed upon it by nature furnish us with practically the only
means we have of directing our actions
toward their proper end.
Certain current errors about Thomistic
philosophy should obviously be corrected
after such an analysis. First of all, it should
be obvious that when St. Thomas speaks of
the derivation of the force of human law
from natural law, he is not saying that
human law is formed by deduction from

40 Id., q. 96, art. 6, ad 2.

47

Ibid.

41 Id., q. 97, art. 3, ad 2.

48

Id., q. 96, art. 4.

46 Id., q. 97, art. 4, ad 3.

42

Id., q. 96, art. 6.

49 Ibid.

43

Id.,

5o Id., qq. 92, art. 1, ad 4; 96, art. 4.

q. 96, art. 6, ad I.

44 Id., q. 97, art. 4.

51 Id., qq. 94, art. 6, ad 3; 93, art. 3, ad 2.

45 Ibid.

52

Id., q. 96, art. 4.
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natural law premises. Neither is he saying
that if you know the first indemonstrable
principles of natural law you know all the
answers about applying laws to human beings. He is in fact saying precisely the contrary. Neither does he identify natural law
with Divine law, with eternal law, with
canon law, with human law, nor with positive law, whether human or Divine. He is
saying the contrary of that also. A third
obvious error which should be corrected
after reading what he says, is the one which
would associate him with those who identify natural law with the absolute and unchangeable when, as a matter of fact, he
shows that whatever may be the nature of
law in the mind of the Creator, our knowledge of it is variable, relative, and subject
to error, since it is concerned with the contingent and the particular, insofar as human
actions are judged.
Another aspect of our knowledge of law
is brought out by this analysis of St.
Thomas' treatise insofar as the subject of
individual cases is concerned. The case
method, which is characteristic of the Common Law system since Bracton's day, shifts
the emphasis on law away from general
rules and toward their application in particular situations. St. Thomas Aquinas was
more familiar in his personal experience
with the codification of Roman Law than
he was with Bracton's problem as a judge
of the King's Bench in England. Nevertheless, his understanding of the necessity of
justice in individual cases was obviously
comprehensive enough to provide a philosophical foundation for the development
of the case method. Can it be that because
he makes allowance for exceptions and dispensations in individual cases, he opens the
way for casuistry or for law administered

according to the length of the Chancellor's
foot, as the saying was? Such would not
appear to be the case, since he expects that
the law will be obeyed in the majority of
cases, that stability will be maintained by
custom or the repetition of similar acts, and
that even unjust law should be tolerated
until changed, insofar as it has legal form,
unless it be contrary to the Divine law
itself.
St. Thomas' philosophy of law would require more prudence, not less, in the lawgivers who make law suitable in the majority of cases. It would require more art,
not less, in anticipating changes in law as
man progresses in knowledge from the common to the particular. It would require
greater responsibility on the part of the
whole people the more closely their officials
represent. their conclusions. It would also
demand great fairness and broad viewpoint
in judges whose duty it is to apply the law
in individual cases.
It would appear that St. Thomas' philosophy of law, far from being a support for
absolutists and totalitarian dictators, would
provide the guidance needed for lawgivers
in an age when the strictness of positivism
is giving way to measures extending human
rights. In an era when the swing of the
pendulum seems to be away from equity
toward integrated judicial remedies, it
would seem to sustain confidence in human
judgment in contrast to reliance upon the
mechanical applications of codes. As a middle way between the rigors of positivism on
the one hand, and sociological jurisprudence
on the other, it would seem to justify the
call for a truly realist jurisprudence. If the
revival of natural law theories be restricted
to consideration of the Thomistic philo(Continued on page 179)

